At the beginning of March 2012, South African (SA) Immigration Authorities deported 125 Nigerians who had just flown directly to Johannesburg from Nigeria. After an overnight detention at the Oliver Tambo International Airport, the hapless travelers were sent back home allegedly because their yellow fever vaccination certificates were fraudulent.
On the face of it, the deportation seemed unusually harsh given that among the 125 passengers were prominent people, including government officials. Was there a possibility of error in the verification process?
It appeared contrived that all the125 passengers would have fake vaccination certificates and then travel in the same plane to the same destination. After all, legitimate yellow fever certificates are not difficult to obtain and they cost next to nothing. It was illogical that anybody would risk a forged certificate. Why were the counterfeit certificates not detected by the SA High Commissions that issued the visas in Nigeria in the first place?
Finally, why was the Nigerian High Commission in Pretoria not notified of the brewing crisis once the documentary irregularity was spotted? After all, it is not everyday that a planeload of illegally-documented passengers shows up at the Johannesburg International Airport. It all smacked of a staged scenario.
Nigeria responded promptly and decisively to the humiliating deportation. A former cabinet minister wrote a scathing front-page statement in the next-day Daily Sun (a South African daily) with a “Warning to the Rainbow Nation” that the government of Nigeria would not stand by while its citizens were humiliated in other countries. Furthermore, Nigeria’s humility should not be misconstrued for cowardice.
The Nigerian Presidency demanded an explanation and corrective measures. In the Senate there was talk of retaliatory actions whereby the status of SA businesses and citizens in Nigeria would be reviewed. Finally, there were suggestions of suspension of diplomatic relations and closure of the Nigerian High Commission in Pretoria in protest.
Meanwhile, tit-for-tat activities were underway. In two quick successions, 84 South Africans were denied admission into Nigeria.
The loudest reactions were reserved for the ordinary Nigerians living in SA. Overwhelmingly, they blamed SA for being inhospitable to black non-South Africans, especially Nigerian nationals. To illustrate, they pointed to the xenophobic attacks of 2008 and 2009 where 62 Africans were killed. Through the internet, they claimed that the March deportation was consistent with their daily existence at the hands of the SA police and officials. The deportation was merely a reflection of anti-Nigerian xenophobia on the international screens.
Was there more to the deportation story than met the eye?
Historically, SA-Nigerian relations have been sprinkled with occasional disagreements rather than outright hostilities. Between1994-1998, however, those relations soured to all-time low over Nigeria’s execution of the Ogoni political activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa and his eight co-defendants.
Before the execution, newly-elected President Nelson Mandela tried to persuade Nigeria’s General Sani Abacha to spare the lives of the accused in the interest of humanity and the image of Africa. For a while, Mandela was convinced that his ‘magic’ had prevailed, that the execution would not be carried out. He was mistaken.
When the Nigerian ‘judicial murders’ happened on November 10, 1995, they shocked and disappointed Mandela. What is more, he was deeply hurt by the suggestion that he had not done enough to save the lives of the ‘Ogoni Nine.’ Abacha had indeed betrayed Mandela’s stature globally and in Nigeria. In turn, Mandela damned Abacha as an “insensitive, frightened dictator.”
Unpleasant interaction continued between the giants of Africa. Mandela tried, but failed, to persuade the SADEC countries to take collective action against Nigeria. Meanwhile, in 1996 Abacha barred the Nigerian national soccer team from defending its African Cup of Nations championship because it was held in SA.
Relations improved considerably when Thabo Mbeki took office. He understood the Nigerian ‘vibes’ better than Mandela and was more in tune with the Pan-African spirit. Most importantly, Mbeki brought with him an African agenda which prioritized good relations with Nigeria above the rest of the world.
Henceforth, an atmosphere of reduced tensions in Nigeria-SA relations prevailed. Ambition for continental leadership continued to assert itself, but it was more in form of self-aggrandizement than acrimony. The song went: Nigeria is the older and more experienced brother who had played a key role in the liberation of its younger sibling. SA claimed bragging rights for its brief but impressive democratic dispaly and a much more sophisticated economy.
SA has indeed established an impressive record in the UN, having been elected twice as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. But its ambition for African leadership has recently suffered s couple of damaging setbacks.
In the 2011 Cote d’Ivoire’s political quagmire, SA stumbled, but did not fall, for appearing to support Laurent Gbagbo, the defiant incumbent who was ultimately ousted forcibly. In contrast, Nigeria was on the right side of history for endorsing the final victor, Allassane Ouattara.
The Nigeria-SA soft rivalry then continued to Libya. Nigeria had quickly recognized rebel-controlled Transitional National Council (TNC); SA sided with the vanquished Muammar Gaddafi. Nigeria convinced the AU to recognize the TNT. By all indications, Nigeria was again in rhythm with the heartbeat of Africa.
Seemingly, Pretoria concluded that its 2011 failures in handling African crises were due to the indecisive, weak and ineffective leadership of the AU. Accordingly, SA decided to inject strength into the continental body by taking over the chairmanship of its Commission. Accordingly it challenged the incumbent, Jean Pong, by fielding its competent Home Affairs Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma for the January 2012 election.
Critics, including South Africans, questioned that move. They insisted that, since SA was already a member of the UN Security Council, it should focus on that bigger platform. Others objected to the SA participation in the AU because it exposed the voting process to the vagaries of African divides of regional fissures, linguistic divides of English versus French speaking, and Africa’s sizes: large versus small states.
For Nigeria, SA’s quest to capture the chairmanship of the AU Commission was a violation of a tradition: an unwritten ‘understanding’ that the chairmanship was a preserve of the smaller states to have a say in the running of their continent. For SA to submit a candidate for that post was a provocative act and further proof that it could not be trusted.
As a result, Nigeria reportedly lobbied vigorously against the candidacy of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to become the chairperson of the Commission. It was a matter of principle. The voting resulted in a deadlock.
SA was aware that Nigeria was the key player in undermining what once seemed like a done deal. For this, Nigeria got the deportation humiliation of 125 of its citizens, a deliberate slap on the face. That reaction was diplomatic immaturity. After all, Nigeria slapped right back. What next?
SA quickly realized and acknowledged its error in the entire deportation fiasco. It publicly apologized profusely to Nigeria for the mass it caused. That was diplomatic maturity par excellence on the part of SA, and more.
If SA apologized on realization that it had nothing to gain by continuing diplomatic confrontation with Nigeria, the act was a wise tactical retreat, diplomatic sophistication. After all, another voting for the AU commission chairperson is scheduled for June/July 2012 in Malawi. The last thing that SA needs is an angry Nigeria lobbying against its candidate.