Editorials Opinion and Analysis
sea piracy: can africom save the gulf of guinea
Arild Nodland - June 08 - Download this article in a pdf format here
Sea piracy reached record numbers in Africa’s most important petroleum region in 2007 and 2008. As a result, major flag nations last winter raised their security levels for Nigeria, the country most affected by attacks on rigs and shipping. The International Maritime Organisation last February threatened an outright ban on commercial sailing if the situation did not improve. The Nigerian government, frantically manoeuvring to come to grips the situation, has asked for outside help. The new U.S. Command for Africa – AFRICOM – can assist. But it’s not going to be all plain sailing.
The Gulf of Guinea is the stretch of water defined by Cape Palmas in Liberia to the west, and Cape Lopez in Gabon in the south. In between are a number of coastal countries, including the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea. In the gulf itself, is the small island republic of Sao Tome and Principe. These 10 countries are most commonly defined as the “ gulf states.”
The Gulf of Guinea is increasingly becoming an important supplier of fossil energy. International demands for a steady flow of oil and gas, especially those of the United States and China, are rapidly changing the region’s—in fact Africa’s—geo-strategic significance. Since 1990, oil firms have invested more than 20 billion USD in exploration and production activity in Africa. Another 50 billion was, in 2007, estimated to be spent by the end of this decade.
As capital pours into Nigeria and other gulf states much emphasis is put on enhancing security for foreign as well as domestic investments. Current maritime surveillance and security provisions are not very efficient, partly for lack of strength, unity, and cohesion of Nigerian and other naval forces in the region. In the words of one African Affairs specialist, “No country on the Gulf has a naval force worthy of the name.” Measures are thus being taken to mend some of the shortcomings.
Local and regional initiatives, such as co-operation between naval commanders of some of some the gulf states, have been initiated to address the growing security challenge. A more recent proposal is the “ Gulf of Guinea Guard Force,” the brainchild of Nigeria’s president Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, in which he envisages a regional naval force built and trained with U.S. assistance. Lastly, the establishment of AFRICOM, the U.S. Command for Africa, is a clear sign that the interest in the Gulf of Guinea reaches far beyond African borders, and that these interests needs to be better protected.
Nigeria ’s Maritime Security Challenges
Nigeria tops the Gulf’s list of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships. Out of 178 attacks reported by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) between 2003 and 2007, 137 took place in or just offshore Nigeria. If one adds attack on rigs and other fixed petroleum infrastructure the numbers rise. Kidnapping, the curse of the Niger Delta in 2006 and 2007, dropped sharply towards the end of last year and only one foreigner has been taken so far in 2008. Still, insecurity remains. The decrease in foreign hostage taking has more to do with the draconian security measures put in place by international oil companies working in the Delta, relocation, and a government security offensive, than any real improvement in the situation. The kidnappers – mainly criminal gangs, village pressure groups and armed militants of a more or less political inclination – took to the waters when their lucrative hunting grounds on shore dried up.
During 2007, 53 attacks on international shipping and off-shore installations occurred, according to Bergen Risk Solutions, a risk management firm. 23 were carried out in the first quarter of 2008. Oyibos—the Nigerian term for foreigners—are, however, not the only ones concerned about insecurity on the seas. According to Nigeria’s Director of Fisheries, Mr. Akinshola Amile, piracy attacks on Nigerian fishing vessels have steadily increased from 4 reported attacks in 2003 to more than 107 in 2007.
The Nigerian government is well aware of the problems but are struggling to cope with them. A main challenge is lack of hardware. On 5 June 2007, Rear Admiral Peter Shola Adeniyi, Commanding Officer of Eastern Naval Command in Calabar, argued that “if the Navy was given more resources, like the provision of more platforms, it would do more than it is already doing in combating sea piracy”. Meanwhile, the Senate Committee on the Navy, on 5 December 2007 reiterated that the Nigerian Navy lacked equipment to contain the superior fire power of the militants operating in the Niger Delta.
There is, clearly, little consolation in the high attack numbers, but there are patterns. By studying them, seafarers can mitigate the risk of a security incident by avoiding the most dangerous areas, or by employing measures of preparation and deterrence if they have to venture into high-risk zones.
First of all, there are geographical patterns. Lagos, the area off Escravos and Benin River (in Delta state) and Bonny River, the stretch of water leading from Bonny Island to Port Harcourt in Rivers State are the areas most recently affected by maritime insecurity.
Secondly, there are significant differences in the nature of acts of matitime crime in Lagos and the Niger Delta. Whereas Lagos incidents clearly are executed by small-time bandits motivated purely by financial gain—most attacks hardly qualify as piracy and many a would-be robber jumps ship at the sight of a sturdy sailor—maritime raids in the Delta often have a more determined, political, and violent dimension. Also, whilst kidnap for ransom has been commonplace in the Delta, it is non-existent in Lagos. Attacks in the Niger Delta are also better co-ordinated and often entail the use of numerous fast attack craft, explosives and heavy weapons, such as .50 calibre machine guns and rocket propelled grenades.
Third, the success rate (from the pirates’ perspective) is higher in the Delta than in Lagos. Fourth, no attacks have occurred outside the 35 Nautical Mile mark in the Delta and 20 Nautical Miles off Lagos. Fifth, most attacks, especially in Lagos, take place at night. Sixth, the most popular targets are berthed or drifting vessels—or fixed installations like oil rigs, barges or FSOs/FPSOs.
The Delta’s dangerous cocktail of crime and political activism has led to a sustained string of attacks that has been a constant, indeed increasing, risk. In August 2007, Port Harcourt, home of the petroleum industry and capital of the oil rich Rivers State, saw the worst fighting in years as criminal gangs went on a rampage. The situation was defused only after Nigerian government forces launched a massive counter offensive and rebels and politicians agreed to talk. So far the talks have yielded few results.
AFRICOM – What Role in the Gulf of Guinea?
Over the last couple of years the Bush Administration, in seeking to diversify its source of energy supply, has purposely labored to reduce U.S. dependence on Middle-Eastern oil. Consequently, U.S. focus on the Gulf of Guinea has increased significantly in the aftermath of 9-11 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq. On 6 February 2007, the Bush Administration announced its intention to create a new unified combatant command for Africa.
AFRICOM was officially launched as a sub-unit under U.S. European Command (EUCOM) on 1 October 2007 and is expected to become fully operational as a stand-alone command by 30 September 2008. Its aim is to promote U.S. interests and national security objectives in Africa and its surrounding waters. Among those interests, according to Washington’s Congressional Research Service, are “Africa’s role in the Global War on Terror and potential threats posed by ‘uncontrolled spaces’ (interpreted as a bad omen by critics); the growing importance of Africa’s natural resources, particularly energy resources; and ongoing concern for Africa’s many humanitarian crises and armed conflicts.”
Several nations have been courted with aid and training programs of all sorts with one objective in mind: to welcome an increased U.S. presence on the continent. According to official U.S. sources “the President’s intent is to have AFRICOM located on the African continent where it can best interact with partner nations.” The problem is that only a few countries—among them, Liberia—want American military bases on their soil, even though some of them, in security terms, could use a helping hand. Currently, AFRICOM is headquartered at Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany. On 19 November 2007, Nigeria formally announced that it would not host AFRICOM.
The government made its position official as President Yar'Adua met with state governors and federal lawmakers. Nigeria is also, at least publicly, against the U.S. command basing its headquarters elsewhere in West Africa. The rejection of AFRICOM is grounded in the desire to appear independent of outside influence, even though co-operation with the U.S. on many levels is desired, required and already implemented. For example, Exercise Maritime Safari-Lagos 2008, a joint maritime surveillance training exercise involving the Nigerian Navy, Air Force, and U.S. Navy, was held 22-28 February 2008.
Another sign of Nigeria’s willingness to accept U.S. presence, short of American bases, is the African Partnership Station scheme, a naval assistance program. An agreement was reached at the beginning of November 2007 that granted Washington a chance to maintain a naval presence in this strategically important region, providing training and humanitarian aid.
SIGN OF THE TIMES - THE USS FORT MCHENRY. SHE TOURED THE GULF OF GUINEA FROM JANUARY TO APRIL 2008 AS PART OF U.S. EFFORTS TO WIN AFRICAN HEARTS AND MINDS – AND ENHANCE NAVAL SECURITY.
Even though Nigeria needs, indeed welcomes, U.S. support, Yar’Adua’s government has to balance its maritime security needs with the country’s other domestic interests, and its obligations to other important partners, like China, which is a key supporter and financier of federal government projects. In addition, Nigeria’s large Muslim population could find U.S. interference hard to accept. Also, American meddling in Nigerian affairs can be interpreted, or construed, as a sign of weakness and caving into foreign ambitions, which touches upon the issue of national pride. Some African opinion makers and state leaders are merciless critics of what they perceive as U.S. “imperialism”.
In the face of African resentment, President George Bush has worked hard to convince the continent’s leaders of America’s good intentions. In addition to a much publicized tour of Africa in February 2008 the Bush Administration has, for years, spent billions of dollars on humanitarian assistance. Still, the U.S. government is not handing out something for nothing. There is a strategy behind America’s newborn generosity towards Africa, and a central goal of this strategy is to secure U.S. access to energy resources.
As for Nigeria, U.S. concerns are spelled out in the most recent Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence, released on 5 February 2008. It reads: “Persistent insecurity in Nigeria’s oil producing region, the Niger Delta, poses a direct threat to U.S. strategic interests in sub-Saharan Africa.” The task then becomes to balance the need for access to oil with a policy that does not offend Nigeria and other countries in the Gulf of Guinea. Statesmanship, tact, persistence, and wisdom are required on both sides of the Atlantic in order to try to address constructively the security dilemma in Nigerian waters and the wider Gulf of Guinea. Just maintaining the status quo, or worse, letting Nigeria slip even further into despair, is not in the interest of anyone.
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About the Author
Arild Nodland is the CEO of Bergen Risk Solutions. He has previously worked as advisor to the European Union and the United Nations and has some 15 years experience in analysing political and security risks.
